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THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION AND THE
MEANING OF SPEECH
Charles W. Collier+
In common usage the communication of information is not sharply
distinguished from the use of language or speech to make factual or
propositional statements. So it should come as no surprise that one of the main
legal justifications for protecting speech--that it underwrites a “marketplace of
ideas” and thereby contributes to the search for truth--has strong parallels in
the economic theory of information. “Indeed,” as Kenneth Arrow writes, “the
market system as a whole has frequently been considered as an organization for
the allocation of resources; the typical argument for its superiority to
authoritative central allocation has been the greater intake of information
through having many participants.”
As it turns out, however, the concept of information in the extensive literature
on information theory, communications engineering, and mathematical
statistics is ill-suited to serve as the conceptual underpinning for a marketplace
of ideas. To make this argument, I analyze and discuss the scientific notion of
information, especially in its capacity as a commodity that can be exchanged on
a market; I then turn to the special constitutional and statutory protections for
speech, especially those based or premised on a “marketplace of ideas”--the
defining theory of protected speech.
As I conclude, the prospects for developing a marketplace of ideas within
standard economic theory are decidedly gloomy. “The chief point made here,”
Arrow reminds us, “is the difficulty of creating a market for information if one
should be desired for any reason.” “The presumption that free markets will lead
to an efficient allocation of resources is not valid in this case.” Information
theory cannot underwrite even a “marketplace of information,” much less a
marketplace of ideas.

+
Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Florida. Kenneth Arrow, Amar Bhidé, Timothy
Endicott, and Richard A. Posner provided helpful comments, suggestions, and criticisms. All
opinions expressed in this article are mine alone.
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Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be monopolized and
traded in by tickets, and statutes, and standards. We must not think to
make a staple commodity of all the knowledge in the land, to mark
and license it like our broadcloth and our woolpacks . . . . Where there
is much desire to learn, there of necessity will be much arguing, much
writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in
the making.
—John Milton1
INTRODUCTION
In common usage the communication of information is not sharply
distinguished from the use of language or speech to make factual or
propositional statements. So, it should come as no surprise that one of the main
legal justifications for protecting speech—that it underwrites a “marketplace of
ideas” and thereby contributes to the search for truth—has strong parallels in the
economic theory of information. “Indeed,” as Kenneth Arrow writes, “the
market system as a whole has frequently been considered as an organization for
the allocation of resources; the typical argument for its superiority to
authoritative central allocation has been the greater intake of information
through having many participants.”2

1. JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica: A Speech for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing, in THE
OXFORD AUTHORS: JOHN MILTON 236, 257, 265 (Stephen Orgel & Jonathan Goldberg eds.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (1644).
2. 4 KENNETH J. ARROW, Information and Economic Behavior, in COLLECTED PAPERS OF
KENNETH J. ARROW 136, 146 (1984) (emphasis added).
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As it turns out, however, the concept of information in the extensive literature
on information theory, communications engineering, and mathematical statistics
is ill-suited to serve as the conceptual underpinning for a marketplace of ideas.
To make this argument, I analyze and discuss the scientific notion of
information, especially in its capacity as a commodity that can be exchanged on
a market. I then turn to the special constitutional and statutory protections for
speech, especially those based or premised on a “marketplace of ideas”—the
defining theory of protected speech.
One important implication of this discussion may be singled out. The analysis
provides criteria for assessing emerging arguments to the effect that all
communication of information—including valuable political information,
provided secretly by agents of foreign governments and received secretly by
federal election campaign officials (all in violation of federal election law)—
should be protected by the First Amendment against prosecution.3 Alan
Dershowitz, for example, writes:
[T]here is something worrisome about the current frenzy of criminal
investigations. To me they point to a frightening trend . . . : the
criminalization of political differences . . . .
....
Even if it were to turn out that the Trump campaign collaborated,
colluded or cooperated with Russian agents, that alone would not be
a crime . . . .4
In other words, that would merely be “politics,” (protected) free speech, and the
(protected) free discussion of ideas. But Professor Dershowitz can reach this
conclusion only by confusing information and speech. There is no “freedom of
information” clause in the U.S. Constitution. All such arguments live or die by
the terms of a “marketplace of ideas.”5
3. See, e.g., 36 U.S.C. § 510; 52 U.S.C. § 30121 (discussing contributions and donations by
foreign nationals). “A foreign national shall not, directly or indirectly, make a contribution or a
donation of money or other thing of value, or expressly or impliedly promise to make a contribution
or a donation, in connection with any Federal, State, or local election.” 11 C.F.R. § 110.20 (2021)
(codifying that “[n]o person shall knowingly solicit, accept, or receive from a foreign national any
contribution or donation prohibited” by this law). “A solicitation is an oral or written
communication that, construed as reasonably understood in the context in which it is made, contains
a clear message asking, requesting, or recommending that another person make a contribution,
donation, transfer of funds, or otherwise provide anything of value.” 11 C.F.R. § 300.2 (2021).
4. Alan M. Dershowitz, Opinion, When Politics Is Criminalized, N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 28,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/opinion/politics-investigations-trump-russia.html
(emphasis added); see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, TRUMPED UP: HOW CRIMINALIZATION OF
POLITICAL DIFFERENCES ENDANGERS DEMOCRACY 138, 189–90 (2017).
5. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Off. of Pub. Affs., Appointment of Spec.
Couns. (May 17, 2017) (“Deputy Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein today announced the
appointment of former Department of Justice official and FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III to
serve as Special Counsel to oversee the previously-confirmed FBI investigation of Russian
government efforts to influence the 2016 presidential election and related matters.”).
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My discussion is structured around three contrasts: (I) Cryptography and
communication; (II) Information and speech; (III) Information vs. knowledge.
I. CRYPTOGRAPHY AND COMMUNICATION
Modern communication theory owes much to its origins in cryptography, in
particular to the British decipherment of the German Enigma codes during
World War II.6 Claude Shannon famously asserts that the “semantic aspects of
communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem”; but meaning often
lies just beneath the surface (it could be the location of a German submarine, for
example). 7 For Shannon, the “message” (the information) must be converted
into a “signal” (for example, encoded in Morse code) and then sent over a
channel (“the medium used to transmit the signal from transmitter to receiver”).8
At the other end, the receiver performs the inverse operation: “reconstructing the
message [the information] from the signal.”9
In oral speech, the information source is the brain, the transmitter is
the voice mechanism producing the varying sound pressure (the
signal) which is transmitted through the air (the channel) . . . . When
I talk to you, my brain is the information source, yours the destination;
my vocal system is the transmitter, and your ear . . . is the receiver.10
Shannon’s schematic diagram of “a general communication system” is
strikingly similar to Ferdinand de Saussure’s famous “circuit of speech,” which
originates in the brain of speaker A when a given concept triggers a
corresponding sound pattern:
This is an entirely psychological phenomenon, followed in turn by a
physiological process: the brain transmits to the organs of phonation
an impulse corresponding to the pattern. Then sound waves are sent
from A’s mouth to B’s ear: a purely physical process. Next, the circuit
continues in B in the opposite order: from ear to brain, the
physiological transmission of the sound pattern; in the brain, the
psychological association of this pattern with the corresponding
concept.11

6. See, e.g., ANDREW HODGES, ALAN TURING: THE ENIGMA (1983); DAVID LEAVITT, THE
MAN WHO KNEW TOO MUCH 156–90 (2006).
7. C.E. SHANNON, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, 27 BELL SYS. TECHN. J. 379,
379 (1948).
8. Id. at 380–81.
9. Id. at 381.
10. Warren Weaver, Some Recent Contributions to the Mathematical Theory of
Communication, in THE MATHEMATICAL THEORY OF COMMUNICATION 3, 7 (Bd. of Trs. of the
Univ. of Ill. ed. 1998) (1949).
11. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 12 (Charles Bally &
Albert Sechehaye eds., Roy Harris trans., Open Court Publ’g Co. 1986) (1916).
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An idea is fixed in sound and “a sound becomes the sign of an idea”; meaning
is simply the counterpart of a sound pattern (image acoustique).12 In standard
linguistic usage, the sign reflects an intention to communicate and thereby
encompasses two distinct aspects: the signifier (signifiant), a material aspect
(e.g., the burning of a flag); and the signified (signifié), a conceptual aspect (what
the flag burning means).
The cryptographer, like the linguist, is normally trying to solve a semantic
problem too: What does the “signal” mean; where, exactly, is that German
submarine? In this context, it may be useful to distinguish:
Level A. How accurately can the symbols of communication be
transmitted? (The technical problem.)
Level B. How precisely do the transmitted symbols convey the desired
meaning? (The semantic problem.)13
Focusing mainly on Level A—at least initially—may not be entirely
unreasonable. Think of a very professional and discreet telegraph operator, to
whom you hand a “personal” telegram for transmission: “She pays no attention
to the meaning, whether it be sad, or joyous, or embarrassing. But she must be
prepared to deal with all that come to her desk . . . . [A] communication system
ought to try to deal with all possible messages . . . .”14
It seems most natural to understand the signal in communication theory as a
rudimentary sign in the standard linguistic sense. “[I]t is the signs we transmit,
or physical signals; we do not transmit their ‘meaning’”; and this justifies the
exacting mathematical, statistical study of communication.15 But from a
teleological point of view, conveying meaning is normally the whole purpose of
signs or signals. It is, therefore, hard to conceive of any interest in a truly
meaningless signal—keeping in mind that “[t]he concept of information applies
not to the individual messages (as the concept of meaning would), but rather to
the situation as a whole. . . .”16
A. Technical Analysis of the Transmission of Information
Communications engineers spent a lot of time in the 1920s trying to develop
optimal channels and conditions for transmitting telegraph signals. Anticipating
their conclusions, we may say that a defining measure of the information in a
message is the number of possibilities from among which the message is
selected. Consider by analogy a small mountain stream of such dimensions that
only one fish—of whatever type—can pass through it every second. Now
consider such a stream that is populated by only two types of fish: minnows and
goldfish.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See id. at 66–67, 111–12.
Weaver, supra note 10, at 4.
Id. at 27.
COLIN CHERRY, ON HUMAN COMMUNICATION 44 (M.I.T. Press 2d ed. 1966).
Weaver, supra note 10, at 9.
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Think of the fish as representing messages or units (parts) of messages. Each
different type of fish “stands for” something different. If someone were to
release these fish in a sequence informed by, say, Morse code, a primitive
message might be conveyed. (“[T]his our life . . . findes tongues in trees, books
in the running brooks . . . .”)17
Now imagine another stream—identical in every respect to the first—except
that this second stream is populated by four types of fish: minnows, goldfish,
trout, and catfish. How would we compare this second stream to the first—as to
its “capacity for transmitting messages”? As for “efficiency,” the rate by which
fish can pass through is the same: one fish per second. Again, the type of fish
does not matter. So, if that is what is meant by “efficiency,” the two streams are
equally efficient.
But an obvious difference to ponder would be the greater “range of
possibilities” the second stream seems to present. One can imagine all sorts of
combinations in a four-fish stream that would be quite cumbersome, if not
impossible, to replicate in a two-fish stream. Extrapolating broadly, while a twofish stream might need five or more fish to represent the letter “a” in Morse
code, a twenty-six-fish stream could meanwhile be spelling out an entire fiveletter word, like “antic.” 18
It must have been considerations like these that led Harry Nyquist to formalize
the relationship between these physical properties of a channel—in my example,
the rate of transmitting fish (a constant) and the number of types of fish—and
what he called “the rate of transmission of intelligence.”19 Fish are not
“intelligence”; in my analogy, they are arbitrary but convenient physical things
used as symbolic building-blocks of messages. In Nyquist’s formulation, “the
speed of transmission of intelligence” is “the number of characters, representing
different letters, figures, etc., which can be transmitted in a given length of time,
assuming that the circuit transmits a given number of signal elements per unit
time.”20 More formally, the speed of transmitting intelligence (W) may be
approximated as
W = k log m,
where k is a given (constant) rate of sending “signal elements,” and m is the
number of different types of signal elements (“current values”) employed.21
“Current values” are the types of discrete signals a telegraph system can send;
if, for example, a system can communicate only “On” or “Off,” then it has only
17. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT act 2, sc. 1, ls. 15–16.
18. See H. Nyquist, Certain Factors Affecting Telegraph Speed, 3 BELL SYS. TECHN. J. 324,
325 (1924) (“For example, the letter a in ordinary land telegraphy will be said to be made up of
five signal elements, the first constituting a dot, the second a space and the next three a dash.”).
19. See id. at 332–33.
20. Id. at 333 (emphasis added).
21. If bx = y, then x is the logarithm of y to the base b; for example, 103 = 1000, so 3 is the
logarithm of 1000 to base 10. In information theory, logarithms to the base 2 are most convenient
and will be assumed throughout.
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two current values. Signal elements are the physical constituents and
manifestations of current values, which in turn make up meaningful characters
and letters.
The logarithm of m (log m) is the power (exponent) to which a given base
must be raised to equal m. Where a factor shows explosive, exponential
increases, the logarithm of this growth—showing steady, proportional
increases—may be more useful, as a slower, smoother approximation by “orders
of magnitude” (a common metric in economics, statistics, and the natural
sciences). So, for a given rate of sending signal elements, if the number of
current values is increased, the rate of transmitting intelligence can be materially
increased too. But, by implication, it seems that if one were willing to wait long
enough, the same total amount of “intelligence” would eventually be received,
regardless of the rate at which it could be transmitted.
Ralph Hartley elaborated significantly on Nyquist’s insights in the late 1920s,
particularly in a paper entitled simply Transmission of Information.22 But much
of what Hartley says about information could also be said of a language.
Hartley asks us to consider a hand-operated telegraph system in which the
sending operator has at her disposal three “current values” with which to
transmit messages in code.23 Suppose that instead of working from a preestablished text, the operator was to choose current values “in accordance with
the results of a series of chance operations such as a ball rolling into one of three
pockets.”24
We could transcribe the resulting sequence of symbols “equally well for a
sequence representing a consciously chosen message” as for one sent in
accordance with the above-described random selections.25 “A trained operator,
however, would say that the [random] sequence . . . was not intelligible.”26
This seems so obvious that asking “why?” borders on the naive. Yet Hartley’s
answer is not entirely satisfactory either: “The reason for this,” he says, “is that
only a limited number of the possible sequences have been assigned meanings
common to [the receiving operator] and the sending operator.”27
And who “assigned” those meanings? “‘When I use a word,’ Humpty
Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—
neither more nor less.’”28
But no one can choose what the words of a language mean—in the past, the
present, or the future. No one can “assign” meanings to them. Language is the

22. See, e.g., R.V.L. Hartley, Transmission of Information, 7 BELL SYS. TECH. J. 535 (1928).
23. Id. at 536–37.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 537.
26. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. LEWIS CARROLL, Humpty Dumpty, in THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 148 (Frederick A.
Stokes Co. 1905) (1871).
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affair of everyone, hence the property of no one. To an extent unparalleled in
other social institutions, everyone participates in language, which is why it is
constantly being influenced by all. Only the community is able to establish a
linguistic system—i.e., to institute values whose sole raison d’être lies in
common usage and consent—and even it can do so only over time.29
Consider the transition in English from thou and its forms to you. For
example, “[t]here is some unsuffusing thing beyond thee, thou clear spirit, to
whom all thy eternity is but time . . . .”30 Who made that “assignment”? And
when, exactly, was it made? Hartley says he is trying merely to eliminate
“psychological rather than physical considerations”; but in reality the factors he
faces are imponderable social and historical forces, far beyond the control of
anyone in particular.
Hartley’s larger project is to “estimat[e] the capacity of [a] physical system to
transmit information . . . ignor[ing] the question of interpretation,” and thereby
to “set up a definite quantitative measure of information . . . .”31 Thinking back
to the telegraph system where the sending operator had access to three current
values, Hartley notes that two successive selections make nine different symbol
sequences possible.32 For example, 1*, 2*, or 3* could each be followed by 1*,
2*, or 3*. More generally, the number of current values (s) raised to the power

29. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, supra note 11, at 71. Language always presents itself to the
individual (and to the community at any given time) as an already-established system, articulated
in a traditional fashion that transcends the will of the individual, even that of the community at any
particular time. “At any given period, however far back in time we go, a language is always an
inheritance from the past,” says Saussure. Id. “In fact, no society has ever known its language to
be anything other than something inherited from previous generations, which it has no choice but
to accept.” Id. at 72. Thus, the notion of a linguistic tradition is logically incompatible with
deliberate assignment or human choice. Still, it is clear that languages do change, even if no one
in particular is capable of changing them.
The only way to preserve the “purity” of a language, remarks Saussure, would be to
remove it from circulation. If a speaking populace actually took up an artificial language like
Esperanto, it too would immediately be out of the control of its inventors and would change like
any other language; it would then be “impossible to turn the clock back.” Id. at 76. “Rules acquire
and lose the status of traditions by growing, being practised, ceasing to be practised, and decaying;
and rules brought into being or eliminated otherwise than by these slow, involuntary processes
could not thereby acquire or lose the status of tradition.” H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 176
(2d ed. 1994).
The story, perhaps apocryphal, that the headmaster of a new English public school
announced that, as from the beginning of the next term, it would be a tradition of the
school that senior boys should wear a certain dress, depends for its comic effect wholly
on the logical incompatibility of the notion of a tradition with that of deliberate enactment
and choice.
Id.
30. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 383 (Hershel Parker & Harrison Hayford eds., 2d ed.
W. W. Norton & Co. 2002) (1851).
31. Hartley, supra note 22, at 538.
32. Id.
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of the number of successive selections (n) equals the number of possible
sequences (sn) for a system.33
This total number of possible sequences (sn) “ignore[s],” as Hartley promised,
“the question of interpretation”; unlike the work of a trained telegraph operator,
“each selection [is] perfectly arbitrary . . . .”34 But Hartley then sets out to prove,
somewhat counterintuitively, that his result would be the same, “regardless of
whether or not the primary symbols are grouped [as in letters or characters] for
purposes of interpretation.”35 Here Hartley is thinking of the various current
values as “primary symbols” and the various sequences of these (which
represent characters) as “secondary symbols.”36
The selection may then be made at the sending end among either
primary or secondary symbols. Let the operator select a sequence of
n2 characters each made up of a sequence of n1 primary selections.37
Now, if characters are thought of as the relevant units or building-blocks of
messages, then they should have the same relationship to sequences of characters
as current values have to sequences of current values. Think of current values
in themselves as “unintelligible,” but when combined in certain sequences (as
in, say, a code), as intelligible. The same process should be at work on a higher
level when characters are combined into sequences of characters (e.g., words)—
some intelligible, some not—depending on the code (or language). “We may
think of the various current values as primary symbols and the various sequences
of these which represent characters as secondary symbols. The selection may
then be made at the sending end among either primary or secondary symbols.”38
Hartley discusses the Baudot telegraph system (two current values) “in which
the operator selects letters or other characters each of which when transmitted
consists of a sequence of symbols (usually five in number).”39 Suppose the
operator selects a sequence of three characters, each made up of a sequence of
five primary selections (current values). At each such secondary selection, the
operator has available as many different secondary symbols (characters) as there
are different sequences that can result from making five selections from among
the two primary symbols. For the Baudot System, this number of available
secondary symbols = 25 = 32 characters.40 So, the number of possible sequences
of three characters (secondary symbols) that can result from the operator’s
selecting three characters = 323.
Take three random such secondary selections:
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 539.
Id. at 538-39.
Id. at 538.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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1* 1* 1* 1* 2*
1* 1* 1* 2* 2*
1* 1* 2* 2* 2*
If there were no mechanism for grouping the primary symbols into secondary
symbols, we could have written:
1* 1* 1* 1* 2* 1* 1* 1* 2* 2* 1* 1* 2* 2* 2*
With only two current values to work with, the number of possible sequences of
fifteen current values = 215 (which also = 323). Thus, where s is the number of
current values and n is the number of successive selections of current values,
“the total number of possible sequences is sn regardless of whether or not the
primary symbols are grouped [into secondary symbols] for purposes of
interpretation . . . . This number sn [is] a measure of the information involved.”41
In this form, sn implies that the amount of information increases exponentially
with each successive selection, which is counterintuitive though perhaps
occasionally possible: “For example, the single word ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ when coming
at the end of a protracted discussion, may have an extraordinarily great
significance. However, such cases are the exception rather than the rule.”42
Thus, Hartley instead derives “as our practical measure of information the
logarithm of the number of possible symbol sequences”:
H = n log s
= log sn, 43
where H is the amount of information associated with n selections, and s is the
number of symbols available at each selection. In these terms “the information
is proportional to the number of selections.”44
So, we see here a common theme among Nyquist, Hartley, and (later)
Shannon: A defining measure of the information in a message is the number of
possibilities from among which the message is selected. “The significant
aspect,” observes Shannon, “is that the actual message is one selected from a set
of possible messages.”45 The larger this set of possible messages, the more
information the actual, selected message (once deciphered) conveys.
B. The Origins of Information in Uncertainty
Consider Paul Revere’s famous binary warning: “[o]ne if by land, two if by
sea.” Likewise, legend has it that in 490 B.C. the Greek courier Pheidippides
ran from Marathon to Athens and delivered one of two possible reports (“We
were victorious!”) just before collapsing. Both messengers delivered important,
meaningful “news”—but conveyed little new information.

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 539.
Id.
Id. at 540.
Id. at 539.
SHANNON, supra note 7, at 379.
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“[T]here is more choice, or uncertainty, when there are more possible
events.”46 Again, the perspective of the cryptographer is instructive: more
“choice” for the encoder means more uncertainty for the decoder. We already
know—to a probability of about .5—what Paul Revere or the Marathon runner
will say. It is hard to be “surprised” either way—something that happens, on
average, every other day can hardly be considered surprising. As a preliminary
observation, then: Information is inherently “surprising” (the more surprising
the better).
Shannon brings a strongly probabilistic approach to the study of information,
which may be illustrated as follows. Suppose the weatherman announces one
night: “There is a 50% chance of rain tomorrow in Centerville. Also, there is a
one-in-a-million chance that a huge meteoroid now heading toward earth will
make a direct hit on Centerville tomorrow, wiping out the entire town. That’s
all for tonight, folks!” If, somehow, you could obtain definite information that
it was, in fact, not going to rain tomorrow in Centerville, your friends planning
a picnic would no doubt appreciate your having resolved that little uncertainty
(which normally is resolved by waiting until tomorrow, when the rain itself [or
lack thereof] will provide exactly the same information). Using just this sort of
example, Shannon introduces a new term for units of information (“binary
digits,” or bits), as a measure of the uncertainty the information resolves: 47
“Bits” of Information
Possible Outcomes
1
1
2 = 2
2
2
4 = 2
3
3
8 = 2
4
16 = 24
5
5
32 = 2
etc.
etc.
The one-in-a-million probability of the meteorite’s “direct hit” implicitly
accounts for one million possible outcomes, only one of which involves a
meteorite striking Centerville. On the “frequency” interpretation of probability,
one could imagine the scenario for tomorrow playing out one million times, with
999,999 Happy Endings. Ruling out the meteorite involves ever so many more
possibilities than ruling out rain for Centerville tomorrow; accordingly, it
conveys proportionally more information.
More generally, as the extent of a “figure” approaches that of the “ground,”
the figure becomes increasingly less significant and, in that sense, less important.
But the opposite occurs when a relatively small, isolated figure emerges only
from against a vast, undifferentiated background. In Merleau-Ponty’s examples
(taken from actual studies), a tiny, pinpoint source of light, projected on a large
46. Id. at 393.
47. The number of bits (the amount of information) is defined as the logarithm of the number
of available choices.
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screen in a darkened auditorium, clearly—and, in relation to its size,
disproportionately—evokes the attention and interest of the subjects.48 Thus,
the “figure” is meaningful only in relation to the “ground.” Likewise, “[t]he
information conveyed by signals is always relative; it depends upon the
difference in the receiver’s doubt before and after their receipt.”49
By successive selections a sequence of symbols is brought to the
listener’s attention. At each selection there are eliminated all of the
other symbols which might have been chosen. As the selections
proceed more and more possible symbol sequences are eliminated, and
we say that the information becomes more precise. . . .
Inasmuch as the precision of the information depends upon what other
symbol sequences might have been chosen it would seem reasonable
to hope to find in the number of these sequences the desired
quantitative measure of information.50
Generalizing, then, we may say that information theory utilizes a standard
paradigm (common to Gestalt psychology and linguistic theory) of relational
meaning, a standard “structure of meaning.”
II. INFORMATION AND SPEECH
The problem with information is not its form; in this respect, flag burning,
cross burning, and draft card burning (all of which have been viewed as legally
protected “speech”)51 are typically more rudimentary. The problem lies in its
content. Information can tell us how to fight a war. But David Paul O’Brien
(the draft card burner) tells us the war should not even be fought. Information
does not comprise or encompass the kind of broad, normative knowledge, ideas,
perspectives, and claims to truth that could speak to such issues. Arguments,
ideas, and knowledge may be viewed, metaphorically, as “commodities”; but—
to complete the metaphor—they should then be traded on an “intellectual
market.”
A. The Semantic Problem(s)
Here are some propositions about information that one would typically not
associate with an intellectual marketplace: Information must not be confused
with meaning. “[T]wo messages, one of which is heavily loaded with meaning
and the other of which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent . . . as regards
information.”52 This is perhaps the hardest idea to entertain. After all, in the
48. See MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, THE STRUCTURE OF BEHAVIOR 7–10, 33–37 (Alden L.
Fisher trans., 1963) (1942).
49. CHERRY, supra note 15, at 182.
50. Hartley, supra note 22, at 536.
51. See CHARLES W. COLLIER, MEANING IN LAW: A THEORY OF SPEECH, 119–20 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2009).
52. Weaver, supra note 10, at 8.
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previous section I just showed that information of any interest can be analyzed
in the standard terms of relational meaning. But meaning is not of the essence
in information; it is not the measure of information.
It is sometimes possible to tell—from its form alone—whether an argument
is valid or invalid, without knowing exactly what it “means.” For example:
Slithy toves are more polite than borogoves.
Borogoves are more polite than beamish boys.
Therefore, slithy toves are more polite than beamish boys.
Or even:
All sinosklaves are really just rotundapères.
All rotundapères are really just skipnischweine.
Therefore, all sinosklaves are really just skipnischweine.
The form of these propositions is unobjectionable; we simply do not know what
their content is. In that sense, we do not know what they mean.53
The opposite (actually, the reciprocal) of information is redundancy, not
meaninglessness. In written English, for example (and apart from a few words
of foreign origin), u is practically redundant after q. There is very little choice,
little uncertainty, and thus little information conveyed when u is added to a
preexisting q. “Information is a measure of one’s freedom of choice . . . [in
selecting] a message.”54 “The greater this freedom of choice, and hence the
greater the information, the greater is the uncertainty that the message actually
selected is some particular one. Thus greater freedom of choice, greater
uncertainty, greater information go hand in hand.”55 Where there is order,
structure, and pattern, there is more meaning—but less information. “[F]rom
the point of view of engineering,” writes Weaver, “a communication system
must face the problem of handling any message that the source can produce.”56
This is “the real reason that Level A analysis deals with a concept of information
which characterizes the whole statistical nature of the information source, and is
not concerned with the individual messages (and not at all directly concerned
with the meaning of the individual messages).”57
In this sense, Daniel Bell’s suggestion that an “information theory of value”
might play a role in the modern economy like that of the labor theory of value
in classical economics, is not without merit.58 Searching for information is like
53. See JIMMY SONI & ROB GOODMAN, A MIND AT PLAY 35 (2017): “Shannon had learned
. . . that any statement of logic could be captured in symbols and equations—and that these
equations could be solved with a series of simple, math-like rules. You might prove a statement
true or false without ever understanding what it meant.”
54. Weaver, supra note 10, at 9.
55. Id. at 18–19.
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id.
58. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Information and the Organization of Industry, in MARKETS,
INFORMATION, AND UNCERTAINTY 19 (Graciela Chichilnisky ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
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sifting through uncertainties. The more sifting required, the more valuable the
eventual discovery. The measure of information is the amount of noninformation that must be sifted aside to find the message—that veritable needle
in the haystack. “Information content is then measured in terms of the statistical
rarity of the signs.”59 This is one reason that diamonds are more valuable than
pebbles. Getting significant information is like solving a puzzle or figuring out
a secret—it requires time, and it requires “labor.”
Now, I think, two rather broad definitional propositions may be put forward:
The measure of information is the difficulty of extracting its meaning.
The measure of speech is the ease of extracting its meaning.
As mentioned above, the form of meaning is essentially the same in both cases:
relational meaning, common to structural linguistics and Gestalt psychology, in
which the figure/ground distinction serves as a basic paradigm. It is, instead, the
content of meaning, and the relative difficulty of extracting meaning, that differ
so markedly.
Technical forces have combined to render the meaning of information ever
more recondite, obscure, and difficult to decipher. The popular slogan,
“information wants to be free” —however well intentioned—was never actually
true. As will be shown in more detail below, information is especially amenable
to being ensconced in secret formulae whose value consists largely in the fact
that they are known only to their proprietary owners.
A better slogan might be: “Speech wants to be free.” Jurists have gone to
great lengths in finding various forms of expression to be protected. As Justice
Gorsuch put it recently, “Americans can say pretty much anything they want for
more or less any reason they want more or less anytime they want.”60 Jurists
have been especially creative in finding meaning in novel forms of “symbolic
speech,” including flag burning, cross burning, draft card burning, nude dancing,
wearing black armbands, and sleeping in public parks.61 The “minimum
requirements” for speech seem to be:
1. For the expression of an idea to count as speech, it must be
“sufficiently imbued with elements of communication.”62 This
“entails at the very least a speaker and an audience.”63
2. “An intent to convey a particularized message” [must be] present.64

59. CHERRY, supra note 15, at 180.
60. Adam Liptak, Amid Protests at Trump Hotel, Neil Gorsuch Calls for Civility, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/28/us/politics/neil-gorsuch-trump-hotelprotests.html.
61. See generally COLLIER, supra note 51, at 89–150.
62. See id. at 91.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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3. “[I]n the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [must be] great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”65
The Spence test contemplates that some forms of symbolic speech will be
more obviously meaningful than others; and that some may have no discernible
meaning at all. “We cannot accept the view,” remarks the Court in United States
v. O’Brien, “that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express
an idea.”66 Even when the “communicative element” in symbolic conduct such
as O’Brien’s—burning his draft card on the steps of the South Boston
Courthouse before a “sizable crowd”—is “sufficient to bring into play the First
Amendment,” a lower than usual standard of protection against regulation
(“intermediate scrutiny”) applies. 67 Whereas for speaking, writing, and other
traditional uses of language, the usual, highest standard (“strict scrutiny”)
applies.68
But why should speech receive any “special protection” against regulation at
all? There have been two especially influential answers to this question—each
with its own distinctive theory and distinguished proponents.
B. The Role of Speech in the Political Process
Consider the following, rather mundane situation arising under the Due
Process clause of the Constitution. You need a new pair of eyeglasses. You go
to your ophthalmologist (or optometrist) and get a new prescription for lenses,
which you take to your optician.
But then, the very next day, you decide it would be handy to have two new
sets of eyeglasses. If you live in Oklahoma, you are in a bit of a bind. Per state
law, you must go back to your ophthalmologist (or optometrist) and get another
prescription for the second set of eyeglasses. “What a waste,” you say!
But all perfectly legal, in Oklahoma:
The Oklahoma law may exact a needless, wasteful requirement in
many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the
advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement . . . . [W]hen it
is necessary to duplicate a lens, a written prescription may or may not
be necessary. But the legislature might have concluded that one was
needed often enough to require one in every case . . . . [T]he law need
not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be
constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction,
and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was
a rational way to correct it.69
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See id. at 91; Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
Id.
COLLIER, supra note 51, at 129–48.
Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
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This is rationality review, the “normal” standard of judicial review under the
Constitution.70
Nevertheless, you might very well start wondering: “Who is behind this
statute?” Could it be the ophthalmologist/optometrist “lobby”? If so, your
recourse is clear: Vote out the rascals—those legislators beholden to the special
interests of ophthalmologists and optometrists! Talk with your friends, send
petitions around, organize rallies, march in marches, and above all, vote.
This is how the “political process” is supposed to work. And assuming it does
work, if the Oklahoma law is really all that objectionable it will meet its doom
through the normal workings of the political process. But now, suppose a law
strikes at the heart of the political process itself—at speech, for example—not
merely at eyeglass-prescription regulations. Here it is not simply a matter of
recourse to the political process; here that process itself is targeted and
threatened.
These considerations led Justice Stone in 1938 to articulate and theorize, for
the very first time, a higher level of protection—heightened review—against
legislative attacks on the political process itself.71 Normally, he agreed,
“regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it
rests upon some rational basis . . . .”72 But Stone then pushed boldly into terra
incognita by openly wondering:
[W]hether legislation which restricts those political processes which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable
legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most
other types of legislation. On restrictions upon the right to vote, see
[Nixon v. Herndon; Nixon v. Condon]; on restraints upon the
dissemination of information, see [Near v. Minnesota; Grosjean v.
American Press Co.; Lovell v. Griffin]; on interferences with political
organizations, see [Stromberg v. California; Fiske v. Kansas; Whitney
v. California; Herndon v. Lowry]; and see Holmes, J., in [Gitlow v.
New York]; as to prohibition of peaceable assembly, see [De Jonge v.
Oregon].73
That is a pretty thorough canvassing of the elements of the political process; and
it highlights the central role of speech. Indeed, there can be no political

70. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
71. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
72. Id. at 152.
73. Id. at 152 n.4 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see generally JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 105–34 (Harv. Univ. Press 1980).
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process—as we know it—without freedom of speech. That in itself justifies
“special protection” for speech in all its forms.
C. The Role of Speech in a “Marketplace of Ideas”
Another approach to heightened review predates the Constitution and goes
back at least as far as seventeenth century England, where authors needed the
imprimatur of the Crown on anything published (licensing as prior restraint).
One particularly aggrieved author was John Milton, who devoted a whole book
to this sad state of affairs.
Some of his main arguments may be summarized as follows: (1) In order to
do an intellectually respectable job of censoring (which entails understanding
the works in question), the censors would have to be as brilliant and erudite as
John Milton himself—hardly likely! (2) The very idea of censorship implies a
low level of cultural and intellectual development, such that the populace has to
be protected from “bad” ideas. But even biblical authorities read those bad
books—with no apparent harm (“To the pure all things are pure”)—the better to
understand and refute them. (3) Good ideas will drive out the bad, in a fair
competition; far better to let them fight it out themselves:
And though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the
earth, so truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and falsehood grapple;
who ever knew truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?74
About two centuries later another Englishman, John Stuart Mill, picked up the
theme of a competition among ideas in his influential volume On Liberty (1859).
Mill (like Milton and Descartes before him) was much consumed with the ideas
of infallibility and absolute certainty; and they led him to some extreme (some
would say puerile) expressions of opinion: “If all mankind minus one, were of
one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would
be no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power,
would be justified in silencing mankind.”75
Still, censorship does imply some form of infallibility. And the best—perhaps
only—basis for certainty about our own ideas is that they have continually been
put to the test of free and open discussion—“a standing invitation to the whole
world to prove them unfounded.”76
There is the greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be
true, because, with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been
refuted, and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its
refutation. Complete liberty of contradicting and disproving our
opinion, is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its truth
74. MILTON, supra note 1, at 269.
75. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY IN FOCUS 37 (John Gray & G.W. Smith eds.,
Routledge 1991) (1859).
76. Id. at 41.
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for purposes of action; and on no other terms can a being with human
faculties have any rational assurance of being right.77
It was left to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., intellectual heir to Milton, Mill, and
many others,78 to pull together their disparate thoughts about a competition of
ideas into a coherent and compelling vision:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly
logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want
a certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes
in law and sweep away all opposition . . . . But when men have
realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to
believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the
only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. That
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.79
With that, we plunge into a foundational economic metaphor. It opens a window
onto a strange new world, where ideas are like things actually exchanged for one
another. Individuals “trade” in those ideas; in a sense, the ideas “compete”
among themselves too—they have a certain independent, irrepressible power.
All this takes place in a free, public “market.” And that market puts a better
price or value on those ideas than any alternative means—better, for example,
than the best estimates of those individual traders themselves. “[T]he power of
the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market” is “the best
test of truth.”80
“[T]he theory of our Constitution” tells us we might be wrong.81 The theory
is at once skeptical and relativizing. What seems clear to us today might be
unclear tomorrow. Even our “fighting faiths” might be unveiled as faith in false
gods. There is a higher standard of truth (“the only ground upon which [our]
wishes safely can be carried out”), but we do not—individually—possess it.82

77. Id. at 39; see also id. at 55 (emphasis added):
Nor is it enough that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own teachers
. . . . He must be able to hear them from persons who actually believe them; who
defend them in earnest, and do their very utmost for them. He must know them in their
most plausible and persuasive form; he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which
the true view of the subject has to encounter and dispose of . . . .
78. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787 (1989);
STANFORD UNIV. PRESS, THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. (Robert W. Gordon ed.,
1992).
79. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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Truth resides in the judgment of the market—the long-term, considered
judgment.
Milton and Mill may have foreshadowed this vision, but a wrestling match (or
a “free and open discussion”) is not a marketplace. The specific economic
implications are new with Holmes’s Abrams dissent. Thus understood, the idea
of a “marketplace of ideas,” as facilitating the search for truth, has become the
leading philosophical basis for free speech and the leading source of special or
heightened legal (constitutional) protection for speech.
III. COMMUNICATION THEORIES AND SOME DEFINING CHARACTERISTICS OF
SPEECH
It often seems in informal usage that communication and speech or language
are, if not exactly synonymous, more or less the same thing—different labels for
two sides of the same coin. Consider the following passages from a leading text
on semantics:
“To say that language serves as an instrument of communication is to
utter a truism. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any satisfactory
definition of the term ‘language’ that did not incorporate some
reference to the notion of communication.”83 “[T]he structure of
language is determined by the communicative functions that it is
called upon to perform.”84 “Furthermore . . . there is an intrinsic
connexion between meaning and communication, such that it is
impossible to account for the former except in terms of the latter.”85
A. A Model of Communication
To bring these issues into somewhat sharper focus, the linguist John Lyons
proposes the following “model”:
[Communication is] the intentional transmission of [factual or
propositional] information by means of some established signallingsystem . . . .86
The restriction to “factual or propositional information” ensures that a
communicative signal “is intended by the sender to make the receiver aware of
something of which he was not previously aware.”87 This, in turn, involves the
possibility of choice or selection on the part of the sender. “If the sender cannot
but behave in a certain way (i.e. if he cannot choose between alternative kinds
of behaviour), then he obviously cannot communicate anything by behaving in

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

1 JOHN LYONS, SEMANTICS 32 (1977).
Id. at 40.
Id. at 32.
Id.
See id. at 32–33.
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that way . . . . [M]eaning, or meaningfulness, implies choice.”88 A second
implication is “that successful communication depends, not only upon the
receiver’s reception of the signal . . . [as] intended for him rather than for another,
but also upon his recognition of the sender’s communicative intention . . . .”89 It
is not enough to “receive” the information; it must be “received as intended,” so
to speak.
As thus elaborated, nothing in this model of communication stands out as
inconsistent with the legal (Spence) test for speech, introduced above:
1. For “the expression of an idea” to count as speech, it must be
“sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,” which entails
at the very least a speaker and an audience.90
2. “An intent to convey a particularized message [must be] present
. . . .”91
3. “[I]n the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [must be] great
that the message would be understood by those who viewed it.”92
Indeed, the Spence Court freely helps itself to an everyday notion of
communication in elaborating the legal requirements of speech. This “everyday
notion,” however, is not the concept of communication involved in the
quantification of information by the statistical theory of communication, or
information theory.
Consider the sentences “He took a book” and “He took a look.” As spoken
utterances, these sentences might well generate some acoustical confusion, or
uncertainty, as to which one was actually uttered on a given occasion.
Any physical properties of the signals which enable the receiver to
identify a particular sound as b rather than l (or any other potentially
occurrent sound), and consequently to identify a particular form as
book rather than look (or any other potentially occurrent form), may
be described as signal-information . . . .93
Signal-information resolves uncertainty as to what the signal is; semantic
information resolves uncertainty as to what the message is (what the signal
means). It is the latter—semantic information—that was at issue in the above
discussion of communication in the everyday sense. “When we say that a signal
is informative we imply that it conveys some semantic information to the
receiver (that it tells him something).”94 But it is signal-information, and its
quantification, that are at issue in the statistical theory of communication.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974).
Id. at 410–11.
Id. at 411.
LYONS, supra note 83, at 41.
Id.
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Signal-information and semantic information correspond roughly to Weaver’s
Level A and Level B, described above.
Thus, we need a new model—a model for the communication of signalinformation:
Let us begin by supposing that there is a fixed and finite set of potential
messages any one of which X may wish to send to Y. Let us further
suppose that each message can be encoded by means of one and only
one signal. Y knows that X is about to send him a signal, but he does
not know which one of the inventory of signals it is to be. We will
now define signal-information content, as a function of Y’s
expectancy, interpreting ‘expectancy’ in terms of probability of
occurrence.95
Our interpretation and application of this model are subject to the theorem
(articulated above by Hartley and Shannon) that signal-information content is
inversely proportional to the expectancy of the receiver—that is, to its
probability of occurrence.
Information is imparted—something is “informative” —only where there is
doubt or uncertainty, i.e., alternatives or choice, selection, or discrimination.96
We may approach this idea most usefully from the extremes. When the
occurrence of a signal is totally predictable (i.e., when it has a probability of 1),
it conveys no signal-information at all. In standard English (as mentioned
previously), u immediately following q is totally predictable and carries no more
signal-information than if it had been omitted. Here, we might say,
“expectancy” turns into certainty, not probability. On the other hand, an initial
j is never followed by b, c, d, f, g, j, k, l, q, r, t, v, w, x, or z. Here, uncertainty
turns into impossibility (i.e., a probability of 0), which is no probability either.
Only in the middle range—where something is possible but not inevitable—do
we have true probability. And here signal-information connects up somewhat
with semantic information, in the sense that meaning implies the possibility of
choice or selection, i.e., uncertainty.
This more technically accurate model of communication and information, it
must be said, does conflict—in fundamental ways—with the legal, constitutional
definition of speech, as enunciated in Spence and other leading cases. This
conflict and incompatibility may perhaps best be illustrated by the role of
information theory in one of natural science’s greatest triumphs.
B. Decoding the Human Genome
Friedrich Miescher discovered the nucleic acids in 1869, a crucial step in the
history of genetics.97 In the course of his career, Miescher tried to conceptualize
the process of hereditary transmission through sexual reproduction, for which he
95. Id. at 42.
96. Cf. CHERRY, supra note 15, at 170–71.
97. See generally HANS BLUMENBERG, DIE LESBARKEIT DER WELT 372–409 (2d ed. 1983).
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proposed a number of models—some physical or mechanical (corresponding
roughly to Weaver’s Level A), and others that might be described as
“semiological” (tracing the transmission of meaningful signs, as in Weaver’s
Level B).98
One of Miescher’s most charming models of the former sort views the egg as
a complicated machine that comes to a complete standstill, for lack of a single,
seemingly minor screw. At the last minute, the sperm provides the crucial screw,
which fits perfectly in just the right place and sets the entire, elaborate machinery
successfully in motion.99 “Nothing more needs to be done . . . . The pure
simplicity of this explanation has to count for something.”100
Toward the end of his life, while engaged in his favorite subject—plant
biology—Miescher introduced another suggestive genetic model (this one of the
semiological sort).101 He notes that large, organic molecules offer “colossal”
possibilities for the relative spatial arrangements of carbon atoms, such that “all
the richness and all the diversity of genetic inheritance can be expressed just as
well here, as the words and concepts of all languages in the 24-30 letters of the
alphabet.”102 It is unnecessary to have “an apothecary’s cabinet of countless
chemical elements” to account for the transmission of all the corresponding
genetic traits.103 Protoplasm and nucleus “originate not from countless chemical
compounds but from a very few individual elements, though these themselves
may have a very complicated chemical structure.”104
Combination and recombination of a relatively small number of elements:
later Schrödinger compares this to the use of Morse code, with only dots and
dashes at its command and yet the ability to express all the words of a language.
In retrospect, it is hard to miss Miescher’s prescient suggestion of a “genetic
code.” But missed it was—by all of his contemporaries and even by his highly
erudite admirer and centennial celebrant, Erwin Chargaff, who belatedly
suggested a related model: “If, from the very beginning, the nucleic acids had
been thought of as a text . . . then, within thirty years, this brief aphorism could
have been turned into a grand epic.”105 As it was, however, the spectral,
shimmering image of the “double helix” still lay eight long decades away, in a
dim and doubtful future.

98. See id.
99. FRIEDRICH MIESCHER, Brief xxviii (2. Mai 1872), in 1 DIE HISTOCHEMISCHEN UND
PHYSIOLOGISCHEN ARBEITEN 70–73 (Leipzig, F.C.W. Vogel 1897) (author translation).
100. Id.
101. FRIEDRICH MIESCHER, Brief lxxv (Dec. 17, 1892), in 1 DIE HISTOCHEMISCHEN UND
PHYSIOLOGISCHEN ARBEITEN 116–17 (Leipzig, F.C.W. Vogel 1897) (author translation).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 117 (author translation).
104. Id. (author translation).
105. Alexander von Erwin Chargaff Muralt, Vorwort zu einer Grammatik der Biologie, 26
EXPERIENTIA 810, 812 (1970) (Ger.) (author translation).
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By 1944 the gene was generally acknowledged to be a large molecule, on
account of its relative permanence in the face of heat.106 “We believe a gene—
or perhaps the whole chromosome fibre,” writes Erwin Schrödinger, “to be an
aperiodic solid.”107
[I]n the vitally important processes of cell division . . . the
chromosomes . . . contain in some kind of code-script the entire pattern
of the individual’s future development and of its functioning in the
mature state. . . .
In calling the structure of the chromosome fibres a code-script we
mean that the all-penetrating mind, once conceived by Laplace, to
which every causal connection lay immediately open, could tell from
their structure whether the egg would develop, under suitable
conditions, into a black cock or into a speckled hen.108
Schrödinger’s lectures, though intended for a general audience, were quite
influential in the scientific community, including Crick and Watson. They sent
him a reprint of their bahnbrechend article in Nature (1953), with the
inscription: “[I]t looks as though your term ‘aperiodic crystal’ is going to be a
very apt one.”109
In 1962, the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was awarded jointly to
Francis Crick, James Watson, and Maurice Wilkins “for their discoveries
concerning the molecular structure of nucleic acids and its significance for
information transfer in living material.”110 To complete this collection of
models, one should perhaps include a rough approximation of the current state
of the theory (as concerns information transfer):
In one of your cells, a strand of your DNA contains the instructions to
build a protein (source); the instructions are encoded in a strand of
messenger RNA (transmitter); the messenger RNA carries the code to
your cell’s sites of protein synthesis (channel); one of the “letters” in
the RNA code is randomly switched in a “point mutation” (noise);
each three-“letter” code is translated into an amino acid, protein’s
building block (receiver); the amino acids are bound into a protein
chain, and the DNA’s instructions have been carried out
(destination).111

106. ERWIN SCHRÖDINGER, WHAT IS LIFE? THE PHYSICAL ASPECT OF THE LIVING CELL 61
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1945).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
109. See Joachim Pietzsch, Perspectives: What is Life?, THE NOBEL PRIZE, http://www.
nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1962/perspectives/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
110. Nobel Prize Outreach, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1962, http://www.
nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1962/summary (last visited Oct. 6, 2021) (emphasis added).
111. SONI & GOODMAN, supra note 53, at 139–40; see also Francis Crick et al., Award
Ceremony Speech, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1962, THE NOBEL PRIZE,
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All of these latter paradigms may be considered “semiological models,” in the
sense that they concern (formally at least) the transmission of signs or messages.
All of these semiological models make use of information theory in its formal,
technical sense. Yet none of them are remotely compatible with the legal
doctrine of constitutionally protected speech.
C. An Intention-Based Theory of Speech
As mentioned above, Spence and other leading cases—in setting out the
minimum legal elements of “speech”—explicitly invoke an everyday notion of
communication and its associated implications of a “speaker” and an
“audience”—all of whom are understood to be human beings or, in
constitutional usage, “persons.”112 Who is the “speaker” of the genetic code;
who formulated and articulated it with the intention of communicating it?
Nature? God? Bringing them within the jurisdiction of the federal courts is not
going to be easy.
Likewise, with the “audience.” Judge Posner reminds us that:
[t]here is a sense in which everything we do consciously and much of
what we do unconsciously is expressive—is the visible counterpart to
(or “expression” of) some “inner” mental state, often an emotion such
as anger or fear or joy . . . . But the expression that is relevant to
freedom of speech . . . is the expression of a thought, sensation, or
emotion to another person. This is a narrower concept of expression
than the first but it is of course enormously broad, encompassing . . .
the whole field of human communication, verbal and nonverbal.113
So, we run into another fundamental problem with respect to speech: To whom
is the “genetic code” addressed? To the “messenger” RNA? To Laplace’s “allpenetrating mind”? They, too, will be difficult to bring within the jurisdiction
of the federal courts. There is, in short, no plausible scenario in which
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1962/ceremony-speech/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2021)
(emphasis added):
The deoxyribonucleic acid molecule can . . . be looked upon as two interwoven spiral
staircases, forming one staircase. The outside of this staircase consists of the phosphate
and sugar molecules. The steps are formed by the paired bases. If it were possible to
stain each base separately, that is each half-step, and if it were also possible for a person
to climb this staircase, this person would get an impression of a tremendous variety.
Soon he would discover, however, that red always was coupled to blue, and black to
white. Also, he would notice that the steps sometimes had black to the right, and white
to the left, or the reverse, and that the same variation was true also for the red-blue
steps. The climber, who in molecules of human deoxyribonucleic acid had to ascend
millions of steps, would see an endless variation in the sequence of red-blue, blue-red,
black-white, and white-black steps. He would ask, what is the meaning of this, and he
would realize that the staircase contained a kind of message, the genetic code.
112. See generally COLLIER, supra note 51, at 89–128.
113. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1092 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring).
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“information transfer in living material” could satisfy the legal, constitutional
requirements of speech.114 “Mother Nature does not communicate to us with
signs or language.”115
Another distinguishing characteristic of speech—as opposed to information—
is that, with speech, an audience recognizes a speaker’s expressive intentions. It
is not enough to receive potentially informative material or come across
something that could be used as a linguistic “sign.”
Consider the following example suggested by Paul Grice:
Those spots didn’t mean anything to me, but to the doctor they meant
measles.116
Here we would have to say that the doctor and the patient—despite their different
“understandings”—received exactly the same information. But we are not
entitled to say, “what was meant by those spots was that he had measles”
(indirect discourse). Nor, adds Grice, can a restatement of the example “be
found in which the verb ‘mean’ is followed by a sentence or phrase in inverted
commas. Thus ‘Those spots meant measles’ cannot be reformulated as ‘Those
spots meant ‘measles’’ or as ‘Those spots meant ‘he has measles.’’”117 The point
of these restrictions is that, in the example, we have no speaker, no speaking,
and thus no basis to formulate or reformulate what any speaker meant. We have
only spots—informative, perhaps, but (strictly speaking) meaningless. To the
doctor, the spots meant measles, but not because the spots themselves said that
or told that to the doctor. It can only be presumed that the doctor had his own
ways of attributing meaning to the spots. For all we know, he could have
consulted a medical handbook on The Meaning of Spots. Now, that book would
be “speech”—though not by the spots themselves, of course.
Suppose I discover that my friend Billy Bob Bartley has murdered someone.
So, I take one of his trademark red handkerchiefs (with its distinctive “BBB”
monogram) and place it in some bushes at the crime scene. When the police
find the handkerchief, does it mean “Billy Bob is the murderer” or “Billy Bob is
your suspect”? No—not any more than those spots meant “measles” or “he has
measles.”
But now suppose the police detectives are so hapless that, after three days,
they still have not discovered the planted handkerchief. So, I stride dramatically
over to the crime scene, pull aside the bushes with a flourish, and unmistakably
reveal to the assembled inspectors the incriminating handkerchief, which they
eagerly examine. Now, does the handkerchief, or my revealing it that way, mean
something? This is perhaps a closer case; but I think Grice is right to emphasize
(in a similar example) that the detectives’ recognition of my intention to
114. Nobel Prize Outreach, The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1962,
http://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/medicine/1962/summary (last visited Oct. 6, 2021).
115. CHERRY, supra note 15, at 217.
116. H.P. Grice, Meaning, 66 PHILOSOPHICAL REV. 377, 377 (1957).
117. Id.
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implicate Billy Bob is “(more or less) irrelevant to the production of this effect
by the [handkerchief].”118
But suppose, finally, instead of planting evidence I assemble the police
inspectors in my studio, where on a large canvas I start drawing an elaborate
picture of Billy Bob in the act of committing the murder. As my drawing
gradually unfolds before their eyes, the detectives must gradually realize that I
am trying to “tell” them something; and more specifically that I am, in effect,
“saying” something, like “Billy Bob committed the murder” and “Here is how
he did it—see?” Here, the recognition of my intention to implicate Billy Bob is
not “(more or less) irrelevant to the production of this effect by the [picture].”119
[I]t will make a difference to the effect of my picture [on the police
detectives] whether or not [they take] me to be intending to inform
[them] (make [them] believe something) about [Billy Bob], and not to
be just doodling or trying to produce a work of art.120
. . . Clearly we must at least add that, for [me to have meant] . . .
anything, not merely must it have been “uttered” with the intention of
inducing a certain belief but also the utterer must have intended an
“audience” to recognize the intention behind the utterance.121
Those spots, that incriminating handkerchief the police discovered (even if I
pointed them to it), or even my completed drawing (if the authorities came across
it when I was away)—those are all just so much evidence or information, from
which inductions, deductions, and “educated guesses” can be made. But that is
not how speech works. If I frown spontaneously at something in displeasure
(without knowing you are observing me), you may rightfully consider that
expression a “natural sign” of my displeasure. But if (knowing you are
observing me) I frown deliberately to express my displeasure—to all
appearances, in exactly the same way—and thereby convey my displeasure to
you: What is the difference?
If the audience does not realize I am frowning deliberately (to convey my
displeasure), then, even if the audience concludes I am displeased, I will not
have succeeded in conveying my displeasure. Again, my intentions will have
been “(more or less) irrelevant to the production of this effect by the [frown].”122
I will have inadvertently succeeded only in providing information from which—
as from “natural signs”—informed conclusions may be drawn. But in
meaningful speech, my intention—that you recognize my expression as intended
to convey a message—must play a role in inducing your belief: You believe
what I express, at least in part, because you recognize that I expressed it with

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id. at 383.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 383.
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the intention that you believe it. My speech to you is thus a “meeting of minds”
in the sense that my expressive intentions are (intentionally) revealed to you.
IV. INFORMATION VS. KNOWLEDGE
“The development of language reflects back upon thought; for with language
Isolated
thoughts may become organized, new thoughts evolved.”123
propositions, however true, gain greatly in significance and usefulness by being
integrated into a coherent and unified body of knowledge. This brings us to
another set of statements about information that it would be very odd and strange
to assert of knowledge:
[I]nformation in communication theory relates not so much to what
you do say, as to what you could say . . . . The concept of information
applies not to the individual messages (as the concept of meaning
would), but rather to the situation as a whole . . . [to] the amount of
freedom of choice we have in constructing messages.124
With assertions constrained by requirements of objectivity, by contrast, we
would normally say that we have no “freedom of choice in constructing
messages” (beyond irrelevant stylistic variations); the objects of knowledge
rigorously constrain and determine our meaningful descriptions and analyses of
them. Or, viewed the other way around, it is the objects of knowledge that are
constrained by the conditions that make it possible for us to experience them.
On the assumption that objects—as experienced—are conditioned in
every respect by the nature and limits of our cognition, we should be
able to have some knowledge of objects a priori. . . . For experience
is itself a form of cognition that involves understanding; and
understanding has rules that I must presuppose as being in me a priori,
before objects are even experienced. These rules are expressed a
priori in concepts, to which all objects of experience must therefore
conform and with which they must agree.125
Here, the point is not to avoid redundancy but to avoid saying something false.
Less freedom of choice, less uncertainty, and more knowledge go hand in hand.
Modern philosophy emerges with Descartes’ hard-won epistemological
standpoint, from which all uncertainty has been eliminated, and from which
absolutely certain, “indubitable” propositions may be generated.126
123. CHERRY, supra note 15, at 4.
124. Weaver, supra note 10, at 8–9, 13.
125. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B xvi-xviii (Raymund Schmidt ed., Felix
Meiner Verlag 1971) (1787) (author translation).
126. See John E. Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Kant, 26 REV. OF METAPHYSICS 438, 444 (1973):
Kant, not unlike Descartes, is a foundationalist who demands criteria and wants to
establish knowledge on the universal and necessary, albeit in transcendental terms,
which means the argument to the conditions rather than any appeal to the intuitively
self-evident. By contrast, Hegel looked to outcomes and results so that for him the
emphasis in criticism falls . . . on the action of thought in actually interpreting reality
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A. The Value of Information
“[I]n the statistical and communications perspectives,” writes Arrow,
“information is a signal, that is, an observed random variable, which may be of
no economic interest itself but which is not independent of unobserved variables
which affect benefits or costs.”127 The signal (the information) supports an
inference about the state of the world, including its relevant “benefits or costs.”
In this way, information may come to be viewed as having economic
significance—at least indirectly—as a “commodity.” More specifically:
(a) Information will frequently have an economic value, in the sense
that anyone possessing the information can make greater profits than
would otherwise be the case.128
(b) Information is indeed then a commodity in some ways like other
economic commodities; it is costly and it is valuable.129
But here we are thinking of information as a “commodity” only in a very special
(perhaps even metaphorical) sense. The information may be of “no economic
interest itself”—unlike, say, a ton of steel, which is useful in and of itself (as,
say, an input in production). Arrow also notes that the “algebra” of information
is different from that of ordinary goods: repeating a given piece of information
adds nothing; whereas the same piece of information can profitably be used over
and over again.130
Actually, this discussion highlights what might be called the “metaphysics”
of information: more like an idea than an object, information is intangible. Its
value lies in the truth of the inference it warrants, in its implied semantic
reference (Bedeutung, as opposed to Sinn), and in its potential to be
communicated as such.131 Cherry writes that:
Now it is customary to speak of signals as ‘conveying information,’ as
though information were a kind of commodity. But signals do not
convey information as railway trucks carry coal. Rather we should
say: signals have an information content by virtue of . . . the

and in expressing its intelligible structure. In the former case one looks . . . to formal
and transcendental criteria which are meant to define knowing as such. In the latter
case, one starts with particular determinations of things for the purpose of discovering,
through a critical analysis of the interrelation between the categories involved, just
what and how much of reality these categories actually express.
127. Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Information: An Exposition, 23 EMPIRICA 119, 120
(1996) (emphasis added).
128. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., 1962).
129. Arrow, supra note 58, at 20.
130. See id. at 20–21.
131. See Gottlob Frege, Über Sinn und Bedeutung, 100 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE UND
PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK (n.s.) 25, 26–28, 31–32 (1892) (Ger.).
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alternatives forming the recipient’s doubt; they give the power to
discriminate amongst, or select from, these alternatives. 132
These peculiarities of information come even more to the fore when we
consider what would be meant by “possessing the information” ((a) above). To
possess information is to have access to, if not understand, its intellectual
content—hence the odd term “intellectual property.” It may be economically
useful (valuable) to know something that others do not know—but it is hard to
keep them in the dark for long. “The acquirer of information may . . . try to keep
it secret, but there are many paths by which knowledge is diffused.”133 And it is
even harder to sell secrets at a profit:
In the absence of special legal protection, the owner cannot . . . simply
sell information on the open market. Any one purchaser can destroy
the monopoly, since he can reproduce the information at little or no
cost. . . .
However, no amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly
appropriable commodity of something so intangible as information.
The very use of the information in any productive way is bound to
reveal it, at least in part. . . .
[T]here is a fundamental paradox in the determination of demand for
information; its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the
information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost . . . .134
These considerations lead Arrow to despair of ever theorizing a decentralized
“market for information” in a free enterprise economy: “It follows from the
preceding discussion that . . . [t]here is a strong case for centralized decision
making under these circumstances.”135
Conceptual problems can be traced back to the very beginning of the analysis.
The fact that something is costly and valuable does not make it a commodity.136
Mistakes can be very “costly”; “experience keeps a dear school” and all that.
True love and friendship are rightfully counted among life’s most “valuable”
blessings, though the children’s song is only figurative:
Make new friends,
But keep the old.
[One is] silver

132. CHERRY, supra note 15, at 170–71.
133. Arrow, supra note 58, at 21.
134. Arrow, supra note 128, at 615.
135. Id. at 616; cf. id. at 623 (“[F]or optimal allocation to invention it would be necessary for
the government or some other agency not governed by profit-and-loss criteria to finance research
and invention.”).
136. See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY (2012).
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[And the other’s] gold.137
And even when Richard III cries out, “A horse! a horse! my kingdom for a
horse!”138 he is probably not thinking of (or bidding on) a commodity in any
usual sense.
Economically significant information is more like a secret recipe than a
commodity. As sole proprietor of the recipe, I can produce a potentially valuable
concoction; but its value will presumably plummet if the secret gets out.
The Coca-Cola Company learned this the hard way, when it (briefly)
abandoned the “secret formula” behind the most successful and iconic soft drink
of all time, in favor of so-called “New Coke”—a resounding flop.139
Nevertheless, the company derived the correct economic lesson from this
debacle; and now “as a publicity, marketing, and intellectual property protection
strategy . . . the company maintains that the actual formula remains a secret,
known only to a very few select (and anonymous) employees.”140
B. The Value of Knowledge
The “secret formula” for Coca-Cola is undoubtedly a valuable piece of
information, but it is hardly a paradigm of knowledge. By hypothesis, for a
viable (and decentralized) “marketplace of ideas,” we need a broader form of
knowledge—as opposed to secret information—whose value is not limited to
“mak[ing] greater profits than would otherwise be the case.”141 According to
standard economic theory, “[i]f information is not property, the incentives to
create it will be lacking,” but we would be seeking knowledge that could not or
would not naturally be owned or appropriated.142 “[I]t has been a classic position
that a competitive world will underinvest in research and development, because
the information acquired will become general knowledge,” but we would be
seeking general knowledge that could be freely communicated, shared, and
exchanged without dissipating in value.143 Indeed, these intersubjective features
of knowledge ought to enhance its value and may even be viewed as
prerequisites for “objective” knowledge:
I experience the world (including others)—and, according to its
experiential sense, not as (so to speak) my private synthetic formation
but as other than mine alone [mir fremde], as an intersubjective world,
actually there for everyone, accessible in respect of its [o]bjects to

137. Joseph Parry, New Friends and Old Friends, https://www.poetrynook.com/poem/newfriends-and-old-friends, (last visited Jan. 3, 2022).
138. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III act 5, sc. 4.
139. Coca-Cola Formula, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coca-Cola_formula (last
visited Oct. 8, 2021).
140. Id.
141. Arrow, supra note 128, at 614.
142. Arrow, supra note 127, at 125.
143. ARROW, supra note 2, at 142.
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everyone . . . . This is always co-intended where[]ver we speak of
[o]bjective actuality.144
In standard neoclassical economic models, “an unrestricted flow of information
. . . is incompatible with the complete decentralization of an ideal free enterprise
system;” but a true marketplace of ideas would advance freedom of inquiry,
thought, and expression wherever they might lead.145 “For nothing is hidden
that will not be made manifest, nor is anything secret that will not be known and
come to light.”146
In terms of information theory, “the purpose of all communication is to
influence the conduct of the receiver . . . . [C]ommunication either affects
conduct or is without any discernible and probable effect at all.”147 Likewise, a
commodity is classically defined, in part, by its use value; but if knowledge is
not a commodity, it could completely lack use value. While “information is
socially useless but privately valuable,” general knowledge could be socially
valuable but privately “useless.”148 And just as virtue is supposed to be its own
reward, so too could this form of knowledge plausibly be pursued for its own
sake. Alternatively, one might say that the purpose of knowledge is to provide
perspectives on meaning:
The exclusiveness with which the total world-view of modern man, in
the second half of the nineteenth century, let itself be determined by
the positive sciences and be blinded by the “prosperity” they
produced, meant an indifferent turning-away from the questions which
are decisive for a genuine humanity . . . questions of the meaning or
meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence . . . . Scientific,
objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the world,
the physical as well as the spiritual world, is in fact. But can the world,
and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if the sciences
recognize as true only what is objectively established in this fashion,
and if history has nothing more to teach us than that all the shapes of
the spiritual world, all the conditions of life, ideals, norms upon which
man relies, form and dissolve themselves like fleeting waves, that it
always was and ever will be so, that again and again reason must turn
into nonsense, and well-being into misery?149
Obviously, such considerations go well beyond “profit” and “value” in the
narrow economic (monetary) sense. But these departures are justified by the
144. Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations § 43 (Dorion Cairns trans., Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers 1982) (1960).
145. Arrow, supra note 128, at 618–19.
146. Luke 8:17 (emphasis added).
147. Weaver, supra note 10, at 5.
148. ARROW, supra note 2, at 143.
149. Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology,
in THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY § 2 (David
Carr trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1970) (1954).
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otherwise gloomy prospects for developing a marketplace of ideas within
standard economic theory. “The chief point made here,” Arrow reminds us, “is
the difficulty of creating a market for information if one should be desired for
any reason.”150 “The presumption that free markets will lead to an efficient
allocation of resources is not valid in this case.”151 Information theory cannot
underwrite even a “marketplace of information,” much less a marketplace of
ideas.

150. Arrow, supra note 128, at 616; cf. id. (“[I]nformation is a commodity with peculiar
attributes, particularly embarrassing for the achievement of optimal allocation.”).
151. ARROW, supra note 2, at 142.

